Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Mitchell Hamline Open Access
Faculty Scholarship

2008

In Re Annandale and the Disconnections Between
Minnesota and Federal Agency Deference
Doctrine
Mehmet K. Konar-Steenberg
Mitchell Hamline School of Law, mehmet.konar-steenberg@mitchellhamline.edu

Publication Information
34 William Mitchell Law Review 1375 (2008)
Repository Citation
Konar-Steenberg, Mehmet K., "In Re Annandale and the Disconnections Between Minnesota and Federal Agency Deference
Doctrine" (2008). Faculty Scholarship. Paper 47.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/47

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Mitchell Hamline
Open Access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by
an authorized administrator of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more
information, please contact sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.

In Re Annandale and the Disconnections Between Minnesota and Federal
Agency Deference Doctrine
Abstract

This article explores each of these differences between Annandale’s view of deference and comparable federal
authority. Part II begins the discussion with an explanation of the somewhat complicated legal and factual
background that gave rise to Annandale’s unusually thorny agency deference issues. This section includes an
extended discussion of the Annandale administrative record and the reasoning of the Minnesota Court of
Appeals and Minnesota Supreme Court. Part III then critically analyzes the Annandale court’s claims to have
acted consistently with federal agency deference case law in each of the three areas discussed above. Part IV
concludes with some post-Annandale developments and practical observations for Minnesota administrative
law practitioners.
Keywords

administrative law, environmental law, deference to agencies, Carlota Copper, point source permits, Clean
Water Act, CWA, National Pollution Discharge Elimination System, NPDES, water pollution, EPA,
Environmental Protection Agency, water quality
Disciplines

Administrative Law | Environmental Law

This article is available at Mitchell Hamline Open Access: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/47

5. KONAR-STEENBERG - ADC

6/3/2008 5:59:38 PM

IN RE ANNANDALE AND THE DISCONNECTIONS
BETWEEN MINNESOTA AND FEDERAL AGENCY
DEFERENCE DOCTRINE
Mehmet K. Konar-Steenberg†
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1375
II. THE LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND ............................ 1377
A. Legal Background ........................................................... 1377
B. The Annandale/Maple Lake Wastewater Treatment Plant
Proposal and Administrative Record ................................ 1379
C. Challenging the Permit: The Meaning of “Cause or
Contribute” ..................................................................... 1384
D. Annandale in the Minnesota Supreme Court................... 1386
III. CRITIQUING ANNANDALE ...................................................... 1391
A. Four Claims of Consistency with Federal Doctrine.............. 1391
B. The Federal Framework.................................................... 1392
C. Critiquing Three Out of Four Claims................................ 1397
IV. CONCLUSION: SOME POST-ANNANDALE DEVELOPMENTS
AND THOUGHTS FOR PRACTITIONERS.................................. 1400
A. What Might Have Been: Carlota Copper Revisited......... 1400
B. What Next? Some Thoughts for the Practitioner ................ 1401

I.

INTRODUCTION

1

In re Annandale presented the Minnesota Supreme Court with
a particularly complex administrative law issue: Should a state high
court defer to a state administrative agency’s interpretation of an

† Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. Portions of
this article are based on a piece written for the Minnesota Bar Association Public
Law Section newsletter. I want to thank my research assistant, Rachel E. Bendtsen
(Class of 2008), for her able research and revisions to an earlier draft, Professor
David Schultz for his comments on an earlier draft, and Professor Richard Murphy
for his feedback on Figure 1.
1. In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for
the Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 731 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 2007).
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ambiguous federal regulation that the state agency administers?
Or should it decide that such interpretive questions are too far
removed from the rationales behind agency deference and are
3
therefore more appropriately resolved directly by the courts? In
concluding that deference was appropriate, the Minnesota
Supreme Court followed a century-old pattern of bolstering its own
agency deference analysis with citations to purportedly analogous
4
federal case law.
This consistent reliance on federal cases has been helpful to
practitioners because it opened up a vast reserve of persuasive
authority on these often difficult issues. Close examination of the
Annandale court’s analysis, however, raises questions about the
continued viability of that practice. In particular, Annandale’s
analysis differs from federal agency deference doctrine in at least
three significant ways. First, Annandale authorizes strong deference
to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation that the
agency administers but did not author, a result at odds with federal
case law. Second, unlike federal case law, the court’s discussion of
agency deference in Annandale does not clearly distinguish between
agency deference problems involving ambiguous statutes and those
involving ambiguous regulations. Third, and closely related to the
second point, the court identifies separation of powers as the
common theoretical justification for deference to agency
interpretation of both statutes and regulations—an approach that,
again, contrasts with the federal approach.
This article explores each of these differences between
Annandale’s view of deference and comparable federal authority.
Part II begins the discussion with an explanation of the somewhat
complicated legal and factual background that gave rise to
2. Id. at 505.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 512 (citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)). See also
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984); St. Otto’s Home v. Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 437 N.W.2d 35, 40
(Minn. 1989) (citing Udall, 380 U.S. at 16); Resident v. Noot, 305 N.W.2d 311, 312
(Minn. 1981) (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969)); Knopp
v. Gutterman, 258 Minn. 33, 39–41, 102 N.W.2d 689, 695–96 (Minn. 1960) (citing
Durkee-Atwood Co. v. Willcuts, 83 F.2d 995 (8th Cir. 1936)); In re Abbot’s Estate,
213 Minn. 289, 295, 6 N.W.2d 466, 469 (Minn. 1942) (citing Red Wing Malting
Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1926)); Bemis Bros. Bag Co. v. Wallace, 197
Minn. 216, 227, 266 N.W. 690, 696 (Minn. 1936) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418 (1821)); State v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 95 Minn. 43, 45, 103
N.W. 731, 732 (Minn. 1905) (citing Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264).
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Annandale’s unusually thorny agency deference issues.
This
section includes an extended discussion of the Annandale
administrative record and the reasoning of the Minnesota Court of
6
Appeals and Minnesota Supreme Court. Part III then critically
analyzes the Annandale court’s claims to have acted consistently
with federal agency deference case law in each of the three areas
7
discussed above. Part IV concludes with some post-Annandale
developments and practical observations for Minnesota
8
administrative law practitioners.
II. THE LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Legal Background
Like many landmark administrative law cases, Annandale is also
9
an environmental law case. This particular dispute involved the
10
confluence of two aspects of the Clean Water Act (CWA). The
first is the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES), which requires permits for specific “point-source”
discharges of water pollution affecting “waters of the United
States”—meaning navigable waters, interstate water bodies, and
intrastate water bodies used for purposes of interstate commerce
11
such as recreation and fishing. Although the permit obligation is
federal, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may delegate
12
In addition to
its permitting authority to qualifying states.
discharge or “effluent” conditions, NPDES permits typically contain
requirements governing monitoring, reporting, and other
13
matters.
The other relevant legal regime is the CWA’s state water
quality standards requirement. In contrast to the NPDES regime’s
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV. A caveat at the outset: the Annandale case involves many
issues of both environmental and administrative law. This article does not aim to
address all of them. Instead, it is narrowly focused, as identified above.
9. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984); Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808 (Minn. 1977).
10. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000).
11. Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
12. Id. § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
13. CHRISTOPHER L. BELL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 312 (19th
ed. 2007).
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focus on regulating specifically identified pollution sources, the
state water quality standards regime focuses on establishing the
14
appropriate uses and condition of waters subject to the CWA. To
use an example, a state may determine that in streams whose
designated uses include trout propagation, arsenic levels may not
15
exceed 0.2 milligrams per liter. If a stream does not meet this
standard, it is designated as “impaired,” and the state is further
obligated to scientifically determine how much arsenic the stream
could absorb (plus a safety margin) and still comply with water
quality standards. The process of calculating this “Total Maximum
Daily Load” (TMDL) of arsenic includes cataloging all of the
16
arsenic sources affecting the stream.
A federal regulation promulgated by the EPA, 40 C.F.R. §
17
122.4(i), connects the NPDES and water quality standards.
Because this regulation is central to the interpretive issue in
Annandale, it is worth quoting at length:
No permit may be issued . . . [t]o a new source or a new
discharger, if the discharge from its construction or
operation will cause or contribute to the violation of water
quality standards. The owner or operator of a new source
or new discharger proposing to discharge into a water
segment which does not meet applicable water quality
standards or is not expected to meet those standards even
after the application of the effluent limitations required
by [law], and for which the State or interstate agency has
performed a [TMDL] allocation for the pollutant to be
discharged, must demonstrate, before the close of the
public comment period, that:
(1) There are sufficient remaining pollutant load
allocations to allow for the discharge; and
(2) The existing dischargers into that segment are
subject to compliance schedules designed to bring
the segment into compliance with applicable water
18
quality standards.
The meaning of the phrase “cause or contribute” would
become the major focus of the state permitting action and the
subsequent litigation.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Clean Water Act § 303(c), 33 U.S.C. 1313(c) (2000).
BELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 320.
Clean Water Act § 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2000).
40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) (1996).
Id. (emphasis added).
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B. The Annandale/Maple Lake Wastewater Treatment Plant Proposal
and Administrative Record
In 2003, the cities of Annandale and Maple Lake in Wright
County, Minnesota, proposed to build a new, shared wastewater
19
The cities’
treatment plant to replace their existing facilities.
existing facilities were more than forty years old, and the
anticipated rapid population growth in Wright County, on the edge
of the Minneapolis/St. Paul metropolitan area, was expected to
20
quickly outstrip the capacity of the old plants.
The cities’ proposed facility would discharge pollutants
including phosphorus into waters that eventually feed Lake Pepin,
21
125 miles away on the Mississippi River. In 2002, the Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) had determined that Lake
Pepin was “impaired” under the state’s CWA water quality
22
standards, although it had not yet calculated TMDLs for the lake.
In particular, Lake Pepin suffered from too much phosphorus,
which feeds algae blooms that can deplete oxygen levels and affect
23
water clarity. Now the cities were requesting an NPDES permit for
a new facility that would discharge 2200 additional pounds of
24
phosphorus into the Lake Pepin watershed.
The MPCA recognized that the federal regulation barring any
permits to new dischargers that “cause or contribute” to water
quality violations was going to be a concern for the
Annandale/Maple Lake proposal. A March 31, 2004 draft memo
in the administrative record, entitled “NPDES Permits and
Impaired Waters,” pointedly frames the legal issue—how to deal
with the word “contribute” in the federal regulation:
Issue: 40 C.F.R. [§] 122.4(i) states that “No permit may be
issued to a new source or new discharger, if the discharge
from its construction or operation will cause or contribute
25
to the violation of water quality standards.”
19. In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for
the Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 731 N.W.2d 502, 505 (Minn. 2007).
20. Id. at 506.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 506, 510–11.
23. Id. at 510 n.6.
24. Id. at 507.
25. Annandale Administrative Record at 385, In re Cities of Annandale &
Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for the Discharge of Treated
Wastewater, No. A04-2033 (Minn. May 17, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Administrative Record].
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The memo goes on to observe, “[n]ew dischargers of
phosphorus above Lake Pepin will contribute phosphorus to the
cumulative load of phosphorus causing the water quality standard
violation in Lake Pepin,” and asks, “[h]ow can we continue to issue
NPDES permits to new discharges of phosphorus above Lake Pepin
26
and comply with federal law?”
From the outset—at least according to the picture painted by
the administrative record—the answer to that question would
involve implementing some kind of phosphorus trading system that
would use reduced discharges in some places to offset increased
discharges in others. One of the first mentions of this approach in
the record is in a February 2004 draft by an internal MPCA group
called the “Lake Pepin Trading Group” that was tasked with
“develop[ing] a policy and framework that ensures issuance of
NPDES wastewater permits that are compliant with . . . 40 C.F.R. §
27
The draft described several different phosphorus
122.4(i).”
trading schemes, and recommended one called the “Aggregate
Phosphorus Bank” to track “cumulative credits (phosphorus
reductions)” and “cumulative debits from new or expanded
28
The draft
facilities resulting in phosphorus load increases.”
suggested that this phosphorus bank solution would be “a
temporary system, a bridge” until TMDLs were calculated, and it
29
recommended that this apply only to Lake Pepin.
Curiously, this draft recommendation includes the word
processing traces of a reviewer’s comments and suggested revisions.
Some are intriguing. For example, the reviewer suggests that the
phrase “prohibition found in 40 CFR § 122.4(i) which prohibits a
new discharge that will cause or contribute to the violation of water
quality standards[,]” be revised to read: “requirement found in 40
CFR § 122.4(i) which prohibits a new discharge that will cause or
30
contribute to the violation of water quality standards . . . .”
Another suggested revision would have changed the phrase
“increases in phosphorus loadings located upstream of Lake Pepin”
to “changes in phosphorus loadings located upstream of Lake
31
The reviewer also recommended deleting the original
Pepin.”

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 385.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 327.
Id.
Id. at 326 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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author’s evocative (albeit parenthetical) nickname for the
32
Also,
Aggregate Phosphorus Bank: (“spreadsheet in the sky”).
where the draft criticized another form of trading known as
“permit specific point/point trading” as being too “reactive,
repetitive, time consuming,” the commenter wrote, “[t]his may
slant negatively the need to do point[/]point trading in other
33
instances, we may need to tone this [down] a little.”
In any case, the draft confidently predicted that the “size of the
credit account on January 1, 2005, should be sufficient to draw
34
The draft doesn’t
upon until the completion of the TMDL.”
explain the basis for this confidence in the size of the “credit
account” eleven months down the road (which may be what led our
35
reviewer to note, “[n]ot sure I get this part”). Nevertheless, the
administrative record depicts MPCA officials focused in the spring
and early summer on resolving the 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) issue
through a phosphorus trading policy that viewed the entire Lake
Pepin watershed as the source of pollution creditors and debtors.
Still, some officials discussed the point/point trading approach
criticized by the Lake Pepin Trading Group, in which “one
36
discharger offsets the load of another,” and it was in these
discussions that questions were explicitly raised about whether the
agency had the legal authority to implement phosphorus trading.
A March 2004 memo discussing the point/point trading model
suggested that “MPCA staff and the Attorney General staff should
investigate if there exists current authority for these mechanisms to
be in place or if a state rule needs to be promulgated to begin this
37
process.” The record also reflects some anxiety about the nonlegal considerations confronting the agency as it wrestled over the
permit application and the issue of the federal regulation. An email dated April 29, 2004, entitled “Held up permits,” frets that, if
the Annandale/Maple Lake NPDES permit application and others
affected by the impaired waters question were not quickly resolved,
38
“things will go political pretty soon.”
Late in the summer of 2004, MPCA staff were forced to focus
on a different problem. On August 18, 2004, the Minnesota Center
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 327.
Id.
Id. at 328.
Id.
Id. at 420–24.
Id.
Id. at 496.
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for Environmental Advocacy (MCEA) submitted a comment letter
39
The letter
on the proposed Annandale/Maple Lake permit.
noted that Lake Pepin was not the only impaired water potentially
affected by the project: the proposed project would discharge first
into the North Fork of the Crow River, which the MCEA pointed
out had been listed as “impaired by low dissolved oxygen 16 miles
downstream from the proposed facility,” a condition that MCEA
40
argued was attributable in part to high phosphorus levels. In a
stroke, the idea of drawing upon the broad reservoir of potential
phosphorus “credits” apparently contained in the “spreadsheet in
the sky” to offset the “debits” arising from the proposed
Annandale/Maple Lake facility seemed to evaporate. While the
MPCA was focused on Lake Pepin, 125 miles away, MCEA was
pointing to impairment much closer to the proposed
Annandale/Maple Lake project, where there were fewer potential
phosphorus creditors and debtors among whom a trading
arrangement might be worked out.
MCEA’s letter appears to have jarred some MPCA officials.
One wrote in an e-mail that two colleagues were prepared to testify
that the proposed Annandale/Maple Lake project should have to
“trade its phosphorus load down to zero” unless a net decrease in
phosphorus loading of the Crow River could somehow be
41
demonstrated.
The official argued that MPCA would have “to
show MCEA a ‘bubble concept’ for the North Fork of the Crow
watershed,” meaning some kind of demonstration that net
discharges of phosphorus from Annandale/Maple Lake and other
dischargers into the North Fork of the Crow would be reduced,
42
even if Annandale/Maple Lake itself represented an increase.
The official concluded, “[i]f we cannot show an overall decrease in
phosphorus loading for the watershed, I think we have a
43
problem.”
MPCA found its solution to that problem in a permit that it
had approved three years earlier to upgrade the wastewater
treatment facility in the Meeker County community of Litchfield,

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 1071–74.
Id. at 1071.
Id. at 957.
Id.
Id.
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about twenty-five miles to the east of Annandale.
Like the
proposed Annandale/Maple Lake facility, Litchfield’s discharges
flowed to the North Fork of the Crow River, in Litchfield’s case via
45
a tributary known as Jewitts Creek.
For nearly a decade, the Litchfield facility had been operating
under variances from three state water quality standards (none
46
directly regulating phosphorus) granted by MPCA officials. The
city had requested these variances in 1991, based on claims that the
cost of full compliance would “cause an unnecessary burden on the
47
residents and businesses in Litchfield.” The city had also asserted
that the variances would “not harm the downstream reaches of
48
[Jewitts C]reek, or the North Fork of the Crow River.” Ten years
later, Litchfield went back before the MPCA to propose an
expansion of its facility, and in July 2001 the agency approved the
expansion, which included improvements that were expected to
yield an approximately 40,000 to 50,000 pound annual reduction in
49
phosphorus discharges into Jewitts Creek.
MPCA officials, confronted by MCEA’s arguments on the
Annandale/Maple Lake project in September 2004, realized that
they could use Litchfield’s massive phosphorus reductions, which
50
the record suggests had started taking effect in April 2004, could
serve as phosphorus credits not only for Lake Pepin, but also for
the North Fork of the Crow River. Of course, all of this assumed
that using one facility’s improvements to offset another facility’s
increased discharges was consistent with the federal regulation’s
prohibition on new sources that “cause or contribute” to water
quality violations. Still, MPCA officials were pleased with this
51
solution to MCEA’s challenge.

44. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA), National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination Sys. (NPDES) and State Disposal Sys. (SDS) Permit MN
0023973 (issued July 20, 2001, expiring June 30, 2006) (copy on file with author).
45. Letter from Mayor Ron Ebnet, Litchfield, Minnesota, to Gregory S. Gross,
Division of Water Quality, MPCA (Aug. 12, 1991) (copy on file with author)
[hereinafter Ebnet Letter 1]. “Jewitts” is also spelled Jewitt, Jewett, or Jewetts. Id.
46. Letter from Gbolahan Gbadamosi, MPCA, to Kelly Garvey and Joellen
Rumley, MPCA (Apr. 10, 2001) (copy on file with author).
47. Letter from Mayor Ron Ebnet, Litchfield, Minnesota, to Gregory S. Gross,
Division of Water Quality, MPCA (Sept. 23, 1991) (copy on file with author).
48. Ebnet Letter 1, supra note 45.
49. Administrative Record, supra note 25, at 958–59.
50. Id.
51. “Excellent,” wrote one official. Id. at 991.
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So it was that on September 8, 2004, the word “Litchfield”
made its first appearance in the Annandale/Maple Lake
52
administrative record, and twenty days later the MPCA Citizens
53
Board approved the cities’ permit. MPCA had not yet performed
TMDL calculations to determine how much phosphorus was too
much phosphorus in the North Fork of the Crow River or Lake
54
Pepin, nor was anyone claiming that Litchfield’s reductions would
be enough to clear up either of those waters. Nevertheless, it
determined that, because increases at Annandale/Maple Lake
would be offset by the reductions that it had previously approved
for Litchfield, the proposed plant would “not contribute to water
55
quality standards violations in Lake Pepin.” Point/point offset
trading had prevailed, and the permit issued.
C. Challenging the Permit: The Meaning of “Cause or Contribute”
MCEA challenged the permit in the Court of Appeals, arguing
that the Federal regulation plainly prohibited MPCA from issuing
the permit because the new facility’s 2200 pounds of phosphorus
would “contribute” to the impairment of the Lake Pepin watershed,
56
regardless of what was happening at Litchfield or elsewhere. On
the other side, MPCA argued that although the new facility’s
phosphorus might affect Lake Pepin’s watershed, overall there
would be a significant net reduction once Litchfield was brought
into the equation, such that the federal regulation’s “cause or
57
The agency further
contribute” prohibition was not triggered.
argued that to read the regulation as simply barring all new
phosphorus inputs without consideration of the larger picture
would prevent cities from replacing older, dirtier facilities with
58
newer, cleaner ones, thus frustrating the intent of the CWA.
Resolution of the parties’ arguments required the court to
determine, as a threshold matter, what deference, if any, should be
given to MPCA’s offset interpretation. On this point, the panel was

52. Id. at 958.
53. Id. at 994.
54. In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for
the Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 731 N.W.2d 502, 510–11 (Minn. 2007).
55. Administrative Record, supra note 25, at 1038.
56. In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for
the Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 702 N.W.2d 768, 770 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
57. Id. at 774.
58. Id. at 775 (citing Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992)).
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divided between two seemingly conflicting lines of Minnesota
Supreme Court authority.
The majority invoked a line of authority that includes a case
called Eller Media, in which the Minnesota Supreme Court stated
that it retained “the authority to review de novo errors of law which
arise when an agency decision is based upon the meaning of words
59
in a statute.” This line of authority seemed to suggest that, under
Minnesota law, there was no such thing as deference on questions
of legal interpretation. The majority also approvingly cited a
commentator’s observation that “when separate agencies
promulgate and enforce regulations, deference to the enforcing
agency improperly allows inconsistent interpretation of
60
regulations,” the implication being that MPCA did not deserve
deference for its interpretation of a regulation it did not
61
promulgate.
Having approved this line of authority, the majority made its
consideration essentially unnecessary by finding that “a plain
reading” (that is, a reading not requiring any interpretation) of the
federal regulation’s “cause or contribute” language supported
MCEA’s arguments:
A plain reading of the phrase “cause or contribute” . . .
indicates that, so long as some level of discharge may be
causally attributed to the impairment of Section 303(d)
waters, a permit shall not be issued. Here, the record
demonstrates that, notwithstanding the reduction in
phosphorus resulting from other sources, the waters at
issue remain impaired. And the amount of phosphorus
discharged into the North Fork from the proposed
wastewater-treatment plant, which is more than double
the current [amount discharged by Annandale and Maple
Lake into the same watershed], will contribute to
impaired nutrient levels in Lake Pepin. We, therefore,
conclude that the PCA erred as a matter of law when it
62
issued a permit for the Cities’ proposed plant.
59. In re Denial of Eller Media Co.'s Applications for Outdoor Adver. Device
Permits, 664 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 2003). This part of Eller Media was cited with
approval in the court of appeals’ decision. In re Annandale, 702 N.W.2d at 772.
60. In re Annandale, 702 N.W.2d at 772 (citing 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.11 (4th ed. 2002)).
61. The court did not explain how de novo interpretation of a federal
regulation by a state court would avoid inconsistent interpretations by other state
and federal courts. See In re Annandale, 702 N.W.2d at 768–76.
62. Id. at 775.
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The dissent based its analysis on an entirely different line of
Minnesota agency deference cases, which extended deference to
agency interpretations of statutes that the agencies were charged by
63
law with administering. Based on this line of authority, the dissent
argued that the phrase “cause or contribute” was not clear on its
face, “as evidenced by the meritorious opposing constructions
64
advanced by both parties,” and was “reasonably susceptible to
65
different interpretations.” As such, the dissent argued, the court
66
should have deferred to a reasonable and expert interpretation.
Moreover, the dissent pointed out that the MPCA was required by
federal and state statute to enforce the CWA “and its attendant
regulations,” and that the MPCA therefore deserved deference
67
even if it did not author the regulation.
D. Annandale in the Minnesota Supreme Court
In its review, the Minnesota Supreme Court faced an especially
difficult agency deference issue compounded by the existence of a
seeming conflict in state case law. In resolving these questions, the
Minnesota Supreme Court used federal cases to bolster its own
analysis in several ways.
The Minnesota Supreme Court began its analysis by explaining
that the court of appeals erred when it concluded that a state
agency’s interpretation of a federal regulation was not entitled to
deference, noting that its holding in St. Otto’s Home v. Minnesota
68
69
Department of Human Services, cited by the dissent below, provided
70
guidance on this question. St. Otto’s Home discussed the deference
owed to the state Department of Human Services’ interpretation of
a regulation that it had promulgated, and concluded that courts
should give considerable deference to a state agency’s construction
71
of its “own regulation.”
63. Id. at 777 (Schumacher, J., dissenting) (citing Krumm v. R. A. Nadeau
Co., 276 N.W.2d 641, 644 (Minn. 1979); In re Max Schwartzman & Sons, Inc., 670
N.W.2d 746, 754 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003)).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 776–77.
67. Id. at 777.
68. 437 N.W.2d 35 (Minn. 1989).
69. In re Annandale, 702 N.W.2d at 777 (Schumacher, J., dissenting).
70. In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for
the Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 731 N.W.2d 502, 512 (Minn. 2007).
71. St. Otto’s Home, 437 N.W.2d at 40.
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At first blush, the key phrase “own regulation” would appear to
distinguish Annandale, as the regulation in question was
promulgated by the EPA, not the MPCA. To meet this point, the
court deployed federal case authority:
[U]nlike the case before us, in St. Otto’s Home we were not
required to decide whether an agency’s “own regulation”
is limited to regulations promulgated by that agency or
also includes regulations coming from another source
that the agency is legally required to enforce and
administer. Yet, a United States Supreme Court case cited
in St. Otto’s Home provides us with a reference point on
72
this issue.
73
That federal case was Udall v. Tallman, a 1965 decision in
which the United States Supreme Court noted that a federal
agency’s interpretation of a federal statute was entitled to
deference “when the administrative practice at stake ‘involves a
contemporaneous construction of a statute by [those] charged with
the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion; of making the
parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and
74
The Annandale court stated that it agreed with this
new.’”
reasoning and concluded that “an agency’s ‘own regulation’ may
include a regulation that the agency is legally required to enforce
and administer, even if the regulation was not promulgated by the
75
agency.”
Based on the court’s brief quotation, one might conclude that
Udall was about agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute. In
fact, the case concerned the Secretary of the Interior’s
interpretation of presidential and administrative orders dealing
76
with federal land management and leasing.
It is all the more
remarkable, then, that the Annandale court did not quote the next
few lines from Udall: “[w]hen the construction of an administrative
regulation rather than a statute is at issue, deference is even more
77
clearly in order.” This portion of Udall would seem to be directly

72. In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 512.
73. 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
74. Id. at 16 (quoting Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. Int’l Union of Elec., Radio &
Mach. Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961)).
75. In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 512.
76. Udall, 380 U.S. at 2.
77. Id. at 16.
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on point for the Annandale case. So why didn’t the court go this
78
extra distance to support its reasoning?
At this point in the opinion, the court sought to explain how
the underlying justification for its broad interpretation of “own
regulation” was consistent with the underlying justifications for
79
deference. The court pointed to another of its own cases, In re
80
Excess Surplus Status of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota, in
which the court stated that deference was “rooted in the separation
of powers doctrine” and therefore “extended to an agency decisionmaker in the interpretation of statutes that the agency is charged
81
with administering and enforcing.” The court explained that the
separation of powers justification advanced in Blue Cross was not
only consistent with Udall, but went “beyond” that case by holding
that “when judicial deference—which is rooted in the separation of
powers doctrine—is appropriate, it goes beyond deference to
agency-created regulations and also includes statutes administered
by the agency that the agency is charged with enforcing and
82
administering.” It is not clear what the court meant by this, since
Udall dealt with agency interpretation of presidential and
83
while Blue Cross dealt with agency
administrative orders,
84
interpretation of statutes. What is clear, however, is that the
Annandale court believed that both state and federal precedent
supported its decision to interpret the “own regulation” rule of St.
Otto’s Home as embracing regulations applied by an agency, even if
85
not authored by that agency.
The court’s other explicit references to federal case law dealt
with an aspect of agency deference doctrine that is actually
preliminary to the issues discussed above: Minnesota courts, like
federal courts, state that they will not defer to an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation when the regulation is
78. A possible answer is suggested below. See infra Part IV.
79. In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 512.
80. 624 N.W.2d 264 (Minn. 2001).
81. Id. at 278.
82. In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 512.
83. Udall, 380 U.S. at 17 (identifying executive orders issued by the President
and public land orders issued by the Secretary of the Interior).
84. Blue Cross, 624 N.W.2d at 273.
85. In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 512–13 (“Based on the foregoing case law,
we conclude that when addressing whether to defer to an agency’s interpretation
of a federal regulation, an initial factor courts must consider is whether the agency
is charged with enforcing and administering the regulation such that the
regulation can be characterized as the agency’s own regulation.”).

5. KONAR-STEENBERG - ADC

2008]

6/3/2008 5:59:38 PM

IN RE ANNANDALE

1389

unambiguous. This was essentially the approach of the Annandale
86
court of appeals majority. On this point, the court cited Resident
87
v. Noot, a 1981 Minnesota Supreme Court case in which the court
stated that it would not defer to an agency’s interpretation of its
own regulation “when the language employed or the standards
88
The
delineated are clear and capable of understanding.”
Annandale court stated that the approach in Noot “comport[ed]
with the approach articulated by the [United States] Supreme
89
Court,” and went on to cite Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
90
Resources Defense Council, Inc., perhaps the most well-known agency
deference case in American jurisprudence, and United States v.
91
LaBonte, a more recent and less well-known case, both for the
proposition that no deference would be paid to federal agency
92
interpretations of unambiguous federal statutes.
The Annandale court used this rule in an interesting way to
reconcile the two seemingly contradictory lines of Minnesota case
law that divided the court of appeals. As discussed above, one line
of authority held that courts were to apply a de novo standard of
review to questions of law, which the Annandale court of appeals
majority interpreted to mean that legal questions were reserved to
the court and no deference was owed; the other line of authority
advocated by the dissent assumed that courts should defer to
93
agencies on some questions of law.
In its brief to the Minnesota Supreme Court, MCEA pressed
94
the majority’s line of authority, including Eller Media. In response
to this argument, the court carefully characterized Eller Media as a
case in which it had “apparently found no indication that the
86. In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for
the Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 702 N.W.2d 768, 774–75 (Minn. Ct. App.
2005), rev’d, 731 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 2007).
87. 305 N.W.2d 311 (Minn. 1981).
88. Id. at 312.
89. In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 513.
90. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
91. 520 U.S. 751 (1997).
92. In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 513–14.
93. See generally In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit
Issuance for the Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 702 N.W.2d 768 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2005), rev’d, 731 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 2007).
94. Brief for Respondent Minn. Center for Environmental. Advocacy at 34–
37, In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for the
Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 731 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 2007) (No. A04-2033),
2005 WL 5488629 (citing In re Denial of Eller Media Co.'s Applications for
Outdoor Adver. Device Permits, 664 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2003)).
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[statute] was ambiguous or that [the agency’s] training and
95
expertise were required for its application.” This, of course, is a
clear reference back to the court’s discussion of Noot, Chevron, and
LaBonte. Under this approach, the court reasoned, it was never
called upon in Eller Media to defer to the agency’s interpretation,
96
because the statute at issue there was unambiguous. Therefore,
“Eller Media did not overrule or modify the analytical framework we
previously established for determining when we defer to an
97
The apparent
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation.”
conflict in Minnesota agency deference law was thus resolved.
Having laid this groundwork with the aid of federal case law,
the court restated the factors that it concluded would sustain
deference to an agency’s interpretation of a regulation under
Minnesota law and applied those factors to approve MPCA’s
interpretation of 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i). First, the court concluded
that the EPA’s regulation was the MPCA’s “own regulation,” by
virtue of the fact that MCPA was charged by state law with
98
Next, the court
implementing the state’s NPDES program.
determined, after a long discussion of the CWA and related cases,
that the regulation, especially the phrase “cause or contribute,” was
ambiguous and susceptible to more than one reasonable
99
Finally, the court concluded that the MPCA’s
interpretation.
approach to the regulation, which allowed for new sources of
pollution so long as they could be offset by other recently approved
reductions in pollution, was reasonable because it was “consistent
100
with the purposes and principles” of the CWA.
One other type of federal authority played an interesting role
in the court’s analysis. In 2002, the EPA and the state of Arizona
approved an NPDES permit for the Carlota Copper company to
open a new open-pit copper mine adjacent to Pinto Creek, a water
101
of the United States already impaired by mining pollution.
The
permit was approved by the EPA and Arizona on the condition that
Carlota Copper reduce pollution flowing into Pinto Creek from

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
2007).

In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 515.
Id. at 515–16.
Id. at 516.
Id.
Id. at 516–22.
Id. at 524.
Friends of Pinto Creek v. U.S. E.P.A., 504 F.3d 1007, 1009–10 (9th Cir.
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102

one of its abandoned mines.
Environmental groups challenged
the permit’s offset feature, but in 2004 it was upheld by the
103
Environmental Appeals Board, an arm of the EPA.
The
Minnesota Supreme Court pointed to this administrative
adjudication as evidence that the interpretation of the federal
regulation was “not a clear-cut issue where [it could] just give effect
to an unambiguously expressed intent and therefore substitute [its]
104
Instead, the court reasoned,
judgment for that of the MPCA.”
the regulation was clearly susceptible to multiple reasonable
interpretations, one of which was the MPCA’s offset
105
Based on this reasoning, the court reversed the
interpretation.
court of appeals and upheld the permit.
III. CRITIQUING ANNANDALE
Having outlined the reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme
Court in this difficult case, this section ungallantly critiques it. In
particular, it seeks to show that contrary to the court’s claims to
have acted consistently with federal agency deference doctrine,
Annandale actually pushes Minnesota and federal doctrine further
apart.
The discussion begins by distilling Annandale’s specific claims
to have comported with federal doctrine, followed by a short
overview of that federal body of law. This sets up the main critique,
which is that Annandale departs from federal doctrine in at least
three significant ways: (1) it authorizes strong deference for agency
interpretations of ambiguous regulations authored by other
agencies; (2) it draws no distinction between statutes and
regulations for purposes of deference analysis; and (3) it deploys
separation of powers as the justification for deference to
administrative interpretation of regulations.
A. Four Claims of Consistency with Federal Doctrine
The discussion above illustrates several ways in which the court
explicitly and implicitly claimed to have acted in accordance with
federal agency deference doctrine:
102. Id. at 1010.
103. In re Carlota Copper Co., 11 E.A.D. 692 (2004).
104. In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 522.
105. Id. More will be said about this conclusion and its relation to Carlota
Copper later in this article. See infra Part IV.
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•

In its discussion of St. Otto’s Home and Udall, the court
claimed that its decision to interpret the phrase “own
regulation” expansively was consistent with United
States Supreme Court precedent.

•

In its discussion of Blue Cross and Udall, the court
strongly suggested that separation of powers is the
common justification for state and federal deference
doctrines applying to statutes and regulations.

•

In its discussion of Noot, Chevron, and LaBonte, the court
asserted that Minnesota and federal case law are in
agreement that no deference is to be afforded to
unambiguous legal authorities.

If one considers for a moment the nature of the cases used by
the court to support these assertions, there is another, implicit
claim: most of the federal and state cases cited in the court’s
analysis involved agency interpretation of statutes, rather than
regulations. The interesting exception on the federal side is Udall,
which involved an agency head’s interpretation of presidential
orders as well as his own agency order. But even there, the court
was content to quote only that portion of Udall explaining the circa1946 federal deference rules applicable to statutes, and refrained
from quoting the more obviously analogous portion of Udall
addressing deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous
regulations. The Annandale court’s willingness to rely on statute
cases to resolve a regulation case thus seems to imply a fourth
claim:
•

Throughout its discussion, the court implicitly claimed
that neither state nor federal case law draws any
relevant distinction between statutes and regulations
for purposes of deference analysis.

These four claims are tested against the federal framework
outlined below.
B. The Federal Framework
Federal case law governing agency deference has evolved over
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the years into a somewhat elaborate framework that provides for
different strengths of agency deference depending on what kind of
legal authority is being interpreted (i.e., interpretation of a statute
versus interpretation of a regulation) and the means of
interpretation (i.e., interpretation by means of a notice-andcomment regulation versus an interpretation by means of an
informal letter to a regulated party). Figure 1 provides a simplified
illustration of the federal framework; the discussion that follows
fills in some of the details relevant to the critique of Annandale.
Figure 1. A Visual Guide to Federal
Agency Deference Doctrine
...by
...by means
means of
of Formal
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andComment
Regulation
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Ambiguous
Statutes
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Interpreting
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authorized
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The starting point for most discussions of federal agency
deference (including this one) is the strong deference that federal
courts tend to give to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes,
commonly known as “Chevron deference,” after the Supreme
106
The Supreme Court has
Court’s landmark 1984 decision.
identified some of Chevron’s limits in recent years, but this much
endures: when Congress leaves interpretive gaps in federal statutes,
and assigns a federal agency the job of implementing that statute,
federal courts will defer to reasonable agency interpretations
contained in duly promulgated legislative regulations or decisions
107
in formal (that is, trial-like) administrative adjudications.
Although Chevron deference is often thought to be justified by
108
agency technical expertise, a better argument can be made that
the actual justification lies in notions of separation of powers and
109
political accountability. As the Court explains in a key passage, a
statute might be written ambiguously because Congress wants the
agency to use its technical expertise to fill in the gaps; or ambiguity
might be the result of Congress’s inability to overcome some
political impasse that is then punted to the agency; or ambiguity
might simply be the result of a lack of foresight or even an outright
110
“For judicial purposes,” the Court observed, “it matters
mistake.
111
not which of these things occurred.”
Instead, what matters is that Congress left an interpretive gap
in a statute implemented by a federal agency. Under Chevron, the
existence of such a gap carries a strong implication that it is to be
filled by a reasonable agency interpretation, and to allow unelected
judges to second-guess the policy decisions of agency officials
appointed by an elected President and delegated this power by an
elected Congress would undermine the prerogatives of the political
106. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
107. Id. at 843–44 (“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation.”).
108. See, e.g., Nicholas J. Leddy, Determining Due Deference: Examining When
Courts Should Defer to Agency Use of Presidential Signing Statements, 59 ADMIN. L. REV.
869, 881 (2007) (noting that “whether addressing a question of law or fact, an
interpretive rule, or a legislative rule, the Supreme Court consistently cites agency
expertise as a primary rationale for deferring to agency action”).
109. For an analysis of competing views about Chevron’s justifications, see Note,
The Two Faces of Chevron, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1562 (2007).
110. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
111. Id.
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branches. As the Court put it, “[i]n such a case, federal judges—
who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy
112
choices made by those who do.”
More recent cases have emphasized this connection between
congressional intent and Chevron deference. In United States v.
113
Mead Corp.,
the Court was asked to decide whether
interpretations of statutes contained in tariff ruling letters, issued
by the thousands each year by U.S. customs officials, qualified for
114
In declining to extend deference to these
Chevron deference.
letters, the Court stated that Chevron deference was appropriate
only for interpretations promulgated under a congressional grant
115
The Court
of authority to make rules carrying the force of law.
identified legislative rules and formal adjudications as examples
that meet this test and allowed that there might be other forms of
agency action reflecting “comparable congressional intent” to
116
The
confer upon agencies this kind of lawmaking authority.
Court also identified some forms of agency action that do not
qualify, such as “policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines,” which the Court said were “beyond the
117
Mead thus shows that for purposes of Chevron
Chevron pale.”
deference, the form of an agency interpretation is a critical
consideration because form speaks to congressional intent and
Chevron deference is about judicial respect for the intent of
Congress—in a phrase, separation of powers.
An entirely separate line of authority addresses the
interpretation of ambiguous regulations. This strong form of
deference is known variously as Seminole Rock or Auer deference,
and under this doctrine an agency’s interpretation of its own
ambiguous rules will be upheld unless “plainly erroneous or
118
inconsistent with the regulation.”
Although both Chevron and
Auer lead to strong deference, there are two important differences
between the doctrines for our purposes. First, whereas the
112. Id. at 866.
113. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
114. Id. at 221.
115. Id. at 226–27.
116. Id. at 227.
117. Id. at 234.
118. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock
Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). This rule from Seminole Rock is also quoted in Udall
v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965), deepening the mystery over why the
Minnesota Supreme Court made such truncated use of that case.
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justification for Chevron deference is fairly conceptual, Auer
deference has been traditionally understood to be based on the
more pragmatic consideration that the author of an ambiguous
119
regulation is best positioned to explain it.
Thus, separation of
powers is not ordinarily understood to justify Auer deference, and
for this reason is not strictly dependent on the form of the
120
interpretation in the way that Chevron-after-Mead is.
There is a third form of deference at the federal level, known
121
as Skidmore deference,
which sometimes applies where the
stronger forms do not. In Mead, for example, after the Court
declined to apply strong Chevron deference, it remanded to the
lower courts for consideration of whether Skidmore deference might
122
This flavor of agency deference is both weaker and
apply.
significantly looser in its application than Chevron deference:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions
of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling
upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute
a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The
weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
123
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.
Expertise matters here, because expertise is a key factor in the
124
Also, although
persuasive power of an agency’s interpretation.
119. Thus, in Auer, the Court noted that to require an agency to narrowly
construe its own regulations “would make little sense,” since the agency would be
free to rewrite the regulations more broadly. Auer, 519 U.S. at 463.
120. See, e.g., Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 429–30 (“We recognize that
the Secretary had not taken a position on this question until this litigation.
However, when it is the Secretary’s regulation that we are construing, and when
there is no claim in this Court that the regulation violates any constitutional or
statutory mandate, we are properly hesitant to substitute an alternative reading for
the Secretary’s unless that alternative reading is compelled by the regulation’s
plain language or by other indications of the Secretary’s intent at the time of the
regulation’s promulgation.”).
121. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944).
122. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 234, 238–39 (2001).
123. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
124. Although at least one current justice views Skidmore as an “anachronism,”
a majority would probably find that Skidmore deference persists. See Kristin E.
Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1244 (2007) (“Justice Scalia, concurring in ARAMCO, called
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this form of deference is weaker in the sense that it does not bind
the reviewing court as tightly as Chevron deference, it is also less
encumbered than Chevron deference or Auer deference by
questions of form and authorship. As the Mead Court’s remand
suggests, Skidmore deference may apply to the interpretation of
statutes or regulations contained in a host of interpretive devices
“beyond the Chevron pale,” so long as the interpretation carries the
125
requisite, if nebulous, “power to persuade.”
C. Critiquing Three Out of Four Claims
Based on this discussion, it should be clear that of the four
claims identified above, only one is noncontroversial: federal courts
and Minnesota courts agree that if a statute or regulation is clear
on its face, there is no issue of agency deference—the court applies
126
The remaining three claims are
the clear terms of the law.
questionable.
First, unlike Annandale’s approach, a federal court would be
unlikely to extend strong deference to an agency’s interpretation of
an ambiguous regulation authored by another agency. Recall that
Annandale took a broad view of the “own regulation” language from
St. Otto’s Home, reasoning that “own regulation” might include
regulations administered but not promulgated by the interpreting
127
This stands in contrast with the underlying justification
agency.
of Auer deference, the obvious federal analogue. As discussed
above, Auer deference is premised on the notion that the
promulgating agency knows best what its regulation means; the
Skidmore deference ‘an anachronism’ in the post-Chevron era.”). For a discussion
of Skidmore in the post-Mead era, see Richard W. Murphy, A “New” Counter-Marbury:
Reconciling Skidmore Deference and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1
(2004).
125. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 219–20.
126. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress . . . .”); In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS
Permit Issuance for the Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 731 N.W.2d 502 (Minn.
2007). Of course, determining what is clear and what is ambiguous remains a
challenge. The Annandale dissenters, for example, would have held that the plain
language of the federal regulation unambiguously prohibited the agency from
issuing Annandale/Maple Lake an NPDES permit because the proposed facility’s
extra 2200 pounds of phosphorus would clearly “contribute” to the violation of
phosphorus water quality standards in Lake Pepin. In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at
526 (Page, J., dissenting).
127. In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 512 (majority opinion).
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corollary is that if the agency has not authored the regulation in
question, that justification for strong deference disappears.
128
By way of example, consider Martin v. OSHRC, in which the
United States Supreme Court declined to defer to the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission’s (OSHRC)
interpretation of regulations adopted by the Secretary of Labor,
even though the Commission was charged by law with adjudicating
129
The Martin Court reasoned,
disputes under those regulations.
for interpretive purposes, that those regulations belonged to the
Secretary, not the Commission: “[b]ecause the Secretary
promulgates these standards, the Secretary is in a better position
than is the Commission to reconstruct the purpose of the
130
regulations in question.”
Here, then, is one potential explanation for the court’s
131
mysterious selective quotation from Udall.
Had the court gone
beyond the material in Udall dealing with statutes, and had it
discussed agency deference issues involving regulations, it would
have also had to acknowledge the underlying authority cited by the
132
That line of
Udall court—Seminole Rock, the precursor to Auer.
authority, in turn, is constrained by cases like Martin, which seem to
undercut Annandale’s conclusion that an agency’s “own regulation”
133
may include another agency’s regulation.
This brings us to the second difference between Annandale
agency deference and the federal system of agency deference: by
relying extensively on federal authority dealing with the rules of
agency deference for statutes, Annandale seems to imply that there
is no analytical difference in federal agency deference law between
statutes and regulations. However, in the federal system there are
clearly two lines of authority—Chevron/Mead for statutes and Auer
128. 499 U.S. 144 (1991).
129. Id. at 152 (holding that the court owed no deference to the agency
responsible for adjudications under regulations promulgated by another agency).
For a contemporaneous overview of the issues in Martin, see Russell L. Weaver,
Deference to Regulatory Interpretations: Inter-Agency Conflicts, 43 ALA. L. REV. 35 (1991).
130. Martin, 499 U.S. at 152. Recently, the United States Supreme Court
suggested that expertise also matters for purposes of Seminole Rock deference. See
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256–57 (2006). However, there is no indication
in Gonzales that the Court meant to extend Seminole Rock deference to rules
adopted by other agencies. See id.
131. See In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 512; supra Part II.D.
132. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965).
133. See Martin, 499 U.S. at 152 (declining to defer where agency did not
author regulations).
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for regulations.
Both lines of authority contain their own
freestanding justifications—separation of powers for Chevron/Mead
and the more pragmatic author-knows-best reasoning of Seminole
Rock/Auer. Both also have their own internal rules and conditions.
For example, Chevron/Mead is constrained by questions of
interpretive form; Auer (so far as we know) is not. None of these
nuances make their way into the Annandale schema.
The final difference, closely related to the prior point, is that a
federal court would not be likely to invoke separation of powers in
a case involving agency interpretation of a regulation rather than a
statute. As noted above, Chevron deference rests largely on
separation of powers, and after Mead there is a particular focus on
respect for legislative judgments about the role of the executive in
carrying out policy. This kind of legislative judgment is not really
at issue in a case involving agency interpretation of a regulation,
and even less so in a case like Annandale that involves a regulation
promulgated by the federal government.
To be fair, the court did cite a Minnesota statute that
authorizes the agency to implement the state side of the NPDES
permitting program and an MPCA regulation, noting the
concurrent application of state and federal water pollution
134
regulations.
Based on these references, one might argue that
deference here really was about separation of powers and respect
for the Minnesota Legislature’s judgments. Two points may be
made in response. First, the court did not cite these authorities as
part of its separation of powers discussion; it cited them to try to
show that the federal regulation was the MPCA’s “own
135
regulation.” Second, it is hard to see how withholding deference
to the MPCA’s interpretation of the federal regulation at issue
would have constituted an affront to legislative judgments. Unlike
Chevron and other cases where a legislature’s own statute was the
subject of interpretation, in this case the Minnesota Legislature’s
only real involvement was to authorize the MPCA’s participation in
a federal regulatory scheme. The regulation itself was not
authored by any arm of Minnesota government. Under these
circumstances, deference rules designed to show due respect to the
intent of the legislative branch seem less compelling than the
judiciary’s own constitutional role of ensuring that the law is

134.
135.

In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 515–16.
Id. at 516.
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obeyed.
Thus, despite the court’s explicit and implicit claims, there
does not appear to be a great deal of overlap between Annandale
deference and the federal deference framework. The two models
agree that if the statute or regulation is unambiguous, deference is
not an issue. But beyond that there is considerable disconnect
between the two approaches. The implications of this disconnect
are addressed in the concluding section below.
IV. CONCLUSION: SOME POST-ANNANDALE DEVELOPMENTS AND
THOUGHTS FOR PRACTITIONERS
Whether consistent with federal law or not, Annandale is likely
to be the touchstone for agency deference issues in Minnesota
courts for the foreseeable future. This concluding section briefly
touches on questions of what might have been, and what might
come next.
A. What Might Have Been: Carlota Copper Revisited
As noted above, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis
rested in part on the EPA’s own use of what amounted to an offset
137
That matter did not end when the
in the Carlota Copper matter.
appeals board affirmed the permit, however. About the time that
the Annandale/Maple Lake NPDES permit was being challenged
in Minnesota courts, Carlota Copper’s NPDES permit was being
litigated in the Ninth Circuit. And less than four months after
Annandale approved MPCA’s offset scheme under 40 C.F.R. §
122.4(i), the Ninth Circuit ruled the Carlota Copper permit’s offset
to be illegal under that same regulation:
The plain language of the first sentence of the regulation
is very clear that no permit may be issued to a new
discharger if the discharge will contribute to the violation
of water quality standards. . . . The EPA contends that the
partial remediation of the discharge from the Gibson
Mine will offset the pollution. However, there is nothing
in the Clean Water Act or the regulation that provides an
136. The Annandale dissent makes a similar point. Id. at 527 (Page, J.,
dissenting). In fact, it may be that the real constitutional value at stake in
Annandale was not so much separation of powers as it was the proper distribution
of power between state and federal governments—in a word, federalism.
137. See Friends of Pinto Creek v. U.S. E.P.A., 504 F.3d 1007, 1009–10 (9th Cir.
2007); supra Part II.D.
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exception for an offset when the waters remain impaired
and the new source is discharging pollution into that
138
impaired water.
The tantalizing question, of course, is whether Annandale
would have come out differently had Carlota Copper been decided
first. Would the Minnesota Supreme Court have adopted this
federal appeals court interpretation of the federal regulation at
issue? Or would it still have gone ahead with the view that the
regulation is ambiguous and the MPCA’s offset solution was
reasonable? For what it may be worth, MCEA asked the Minnesota
Supreme Court to stay its deadline for requesting rehearing until
after the Ninth Circuit had a chance to rule, even offering to forgo
rehearing if the Ninth Circuit ended up agreeing with the offset
139
140
approach. The court denied that motion.
B. What Next? Some Thoughts for the Practitioner
Annandale is a mixed bag of clarifications and new questions.
On the clarity side, we now know that practitioners are unlikely to
get far in arguing that the court should always apply a pure de novo
standard under Eller Media. Instead, Annandale sets up a three-step
deference analysis that requires the court to ask:
(1) Is the regulation ambiguous? (If not, there is no
question of deference as the court applies the plain
meaning of the regulation.)
(2) If so, is it the interpreting agency’s own regulation? (If
not, it is unclear what happens; the court will probably
apply a de novo standard, although practitioners might
attempt to make a Skidmore-esque argument here for
partial deference.)
(3) If the ambiguous regulation is the interpreting

138. Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1012.
139. Notice of Motion & Motion for Extension of Time to Request Rehearing
and Memorandum, In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit
Issuance for the Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 731 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 2007)
(No. A04-2033).
140. Order on Request for Contested Case Hearing, In re Cities of Annandale
& Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for the Discharge of Treated
Wastewater, 731 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 2007) (No. A04-2033).
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Second, practitioners with federal experience may find this
analysis comfortably familiar, because it is basically Chevron without
141
the messy questions of form raised by Mead.
Although the court
hasn’t yet directly addressed whether this framework will apply to
deference issues involving statutes rather than regulations, the
answer seems likely to be yes, given the court’s willingness in
Annandale to lump statutes and regulations together in its
deference reasoning. If Annandale signals the beginning of a kind
of “regime change” in Minnesota law that will see this Chevron-type
analysis applied to the range of agency deference issues, as one
142
commentator has suggested, then practitioners should be able to
take advantage of some of the insights of those who have lived with
Chevron for years. For example, one study of Chevron cases showed
that agencies prevailed nearly 90% of the time on the question of
143
whether their interpretation was reasonable.
Armed with this
knowledge, it may be wise for advocates to treat the threshold
question of whether the regulation is ambiguous as virtually
144
outcome determinative.
On the other hand, some things are less clear after Annandale.
In particular, those accustomed to using federal cases as persuasive
authority may find it harder to predict what kinds of federal cases
are going to be persuasive. For example, on the question of “own
regulation,” proponents of deference will probably want to avoid
federal cases that lead to Auer and Martin, even though those cases
are instinctively the most analogous as they deal with agency
deference issues pertaining to regulations and not statutes.
There is something else that practitioners may want to pay
close attention to in the coming years. In setting forth its
restatement of agency deference law as it pertains to regulations,

141. For one of many critiques of Mead, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead
Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005).
142. David Schultz, Administrative Law: The Year in Review, Continuing Legal
Education Presentation for the Minnesota State Bar Association (June 20, 2007).
143. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of
the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals,” 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1998)
(examining Chevron cases in the federal circuit courts in 1995 and 1996).
144. For a general discussion of Chevron’s acceptance among state courts, see
William R. Andersen, Chevron in the States: An Assessment and a Proposal, 58 ADMIN.
L. REV. 1017 (2006).
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the Annandale court installed an escape valve:
When a court concludes that the language of the agency’s
regulation is unclear and susceptible to different
reasonable interpretations and that the agency’s
interpretation of the regulation is reasonable, then the
145
court will generally defer to the agency’s interpretation.
The court did not explain what circumstances might result in
the court deviating from what turns out to be only a general rule.
But it does seem clear that whatever bows to agency authority the
opinion may make, the court retains ample power to deviate from
deference should the need, in its sole discretion, arise.
The court, in short, is still in charge.

145. In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for
the Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 731 N.W.2d 502, 516 (Minn. 2007)
(emphasis added).

